Skip to content
Knowledge

Counter-drone measures explained. Detect, identify, respond

What counter-drone defence is, how detection, identification, assessment and response connect, and who in Germany may do what.

Updated 6 Sep 2026Reading time about 8 minutes

Counter-drone defence is a chain of four links. First a drone is detected. Then it is clarified what is flying there. Then the danger is assessed. Only at the end comes a response. The technical term for all of this is counter-UAS, or C-UAS for short. No counter-drone system is better than the weakest link of this chain. This article explains to security providers, site security and critical infrastructure operators how the links connect and who in Germany is responsible for which link.

Four sensor paths and one data path detect drones

Radio surveillance listens to the radio traffic between a drone and its controller, meaning the control signal and the video signal. It often detects a drone early and with little effort. It fails with drones that do not transmit at all. Those are drones that fly autonomously or are steered through a fibre-optic cable. Both the Fraunhofer IDMT institute and the trade press name this limit explicitly.

Radar picks up all flying objects, regardless of time of day and weather. It delivers direction, distance and speed. Its problem is telling drones from birds. Add to that blind spots behind buildings and terrain.

Optical and thermal cameras deliver the image a human can judge. Only with them can you tell whether the drone is carrying something, or rule out a bird for certain. But cameras need a cue where to look. In fog, rain and with several targets at once they reach their limits.

Acoustics detects the motor noise. It works without a line of sight and hears around corners in built-up or wooded terrain. The Fraunhofer IDMT quotes ranges of 50 to 200 metres depending on ambient noise. So acoustics only helps at close range.

Remote ID is not a sensor but a data path. Since 1 January 2024, drones of classes C1 to C3 in the EU must broadcast certain data via WLAN or Bluetooth. This includes the serial number, the operator number, position, altitude and the pilot's location. Any receiver with a suitable app can read it. The typical range is 100 to 500 metres. Anyone intending harm switches this function off or flies without a class marking.

Why small drones are so hard to pick up

How well a radar sees an object depends on how much radar signal the object reflects. A commercial drone the size of a book reflects as little as a small bird. If it is mostly plastic, the value drops to the level of a large insect. A radar that reports such targets also reports every crow. A radar that suppresses crows also suppresses the drone.

Add speed and altitude. Drones fly low between buildings and trees, where radar and camera have no clear view. They appear for a few minutes and are gone. No single sensor covers all cases. That is why serious systems combine several sensors and merge their data.

Identification and assessment decide the response

Detected does not mean assessed. After detection, three questions arise. What kind of device is it. Who is steering it. What is it up to. Remote ID and radio surveillance deliver the type and often the operator. The flight path shows the intent. A drone circling in patterns over a facility behaves differently from a hobby pilot at the edge of a park. A thermal image shows whether something hangs under the hull.

From these three answers comes the assessment. It assigns the incident to a level. Observe, report or raise the alarm. These levels have to be defined in advance. In an emergency there is no time to invent them.

Who in Germany may respond, and how

The second amendment of the German Aviation Security Act has been in force since 17 March 2026. Since then the federal police have been responsible nationwide for detection and defence at airports. The state police forces act within their powers of danger defence. The armed forces can be called in by the states. They may jam or shoot down drones when severe consequences are imminent. Authorities have jammers, interceptor drones and nets at their disposal. Anyone who intentionally enters an airport security area risks up to five years in prison.

Private operators may detect, record, alert and report. They may not jam, not intercept and not shoot down. A jammer without approval from the Federal Network Agency is a criminal offence. Passive protective measures on the ground are permitted. These include nets over sensitive areas, screening, rescheduled processes and getting people to safety. Since early September 2026 the federal interior ministry has been examining whether private critical infrastructure operators may take over active defence through a Beleihung. That is the German term for the state delegating a sovereign task to a private company. The chemical and energy industry associations reject this. Until a decision, the current line stands.

Who in Germany procures counter-drone systems

The federal police have run their own counter-drone unit since early December 2025. It is set to grow to 300 officers at eight locations. The federal government has budgeted around 100 million euros. Hensoldt delivers counter-drone vehicles to the unit in 2026. The federal joint counter-drone centre has worked in Berlin since 17 December 2025.

The states are following. Bavaria opened the police drone competence and defence centre in Erding on 4 May 2026. It started with over 40 officers and is set to grow to around 100. It provides technology across Bavaria and observes the market. Schleswig-Holstein plans seven million euros and 50 positions.

The armed forces procure interceptor drones and mobile systems for national and alliance defence. On 12 May 2026 the innovation centre in Erding screened systems from over 50 companies from ten countries. Trials were planned for the third quarter of 2026, delivery from 2027. This procurement follows military requirements. It is no yardstick for civilian operators.

Which companies shape the market

Anyone searching for counter-drone manufacturers finds a few big names and many specialists. Rheinmetall offers systems for armed forces with Skyranger and Skymaster. Hensoldt supplies radar and sensors, including for the German armed forces and the federal police. ESG from Fürstenfeldbruck builds complete systems from sensors and effectors for the armed forces and the police. Dedrone by Axon provides software for detection and situation management for airports, prisons and critical infrastructure. Aaronia from the Eifel builds radio detection and direction finding. This listing is neutral. We supply no systems, broker none and recommend none. Which company fits a facility depends on terrain, threat and the legal situation.

What an operator should clarify before buying

First, the threat. Which drones are realistic, how often and from which direction. Second, the terrain. Sight lines, buildings, neighbours and the radio environment determine which sensors work at all. Third, the response. Who sees the alert, who decides, who calls the police and how fast do they arrive. Fourth, the law. Data protection for cameras, radio law for receivers and the line to active defence. Fifth, the documentation. Insurers and authorities ask afterwards whether the incident was detected, reported and logged. Only then is it worth looking at technology.

What this means for operators

For operators in Germany, counter-drone defence is organisation first and technology second. You may see, report and document. Everything beyond that is the state's job. A counter-drone system without a reporting chain is an expensive alarm bell. A reporting chain without a sensor is luck. Our experience from Ukraine since the war began in 2022 shows one thing above all. The chain rarely breaks at the sensor. It breaks between detection and decision, because nobody defined in advance who does what, and when.

Frequently asked questions

Is counter-drone defence the same as counter-UAS?
Yes. Counter-UAS and C-UAS are the technical terms for counter-drone defence. They cover the whole chain of detection, identification, assessment and response.

May a security provider jam or intercept a drone?
No. Private actors may detect, record and report. Jamming, intercepting and shooting down is reserved for the authorities. A jammer without approval is a criminal offence.

Which sensor is best?
None on its own. Radio detects early, radar picks up everything, cameras confirm, acoustics hears around corners. Each has gaps that another closes.

Is Remote ID enough to detect drones?
No. Remote ID helps with drones that carry a class marking and have the function switched on. Anyone intending harm does not transmit.

What should an operator do when a drone hovers over the site?
Note the time, flight direction, behaviour and duration, secure photos and witnesses, and call the police. Protect people and sensitive areas. Then record the incident in the log.

Will the rules for private actors be relaxed soon?
The federal interior ministry has been examining a delegation to critical infrastructure operators since September 2026. There is no decision. Until then the current line stands.

Sources

Back to the overview

Inquiry

Describe your situation in a few sentences. We reply within one business day and clarify in a call whether and how we can support you.

Or call us directly
Jan Bamesberger
Geschäftsführer, Feldwache
Montag bis Freitag, 9 bis 17 Uhr